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OHIO RAILROAD CROSSING LAW:
THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY
DONALD P. TRACI*
0 HIO RAILROAD CROSSINGS have been and continue to be the scene of the
death and maiming of motorists and their passengers. The state legis-
lature has manifested its concern over the dangers that railroad crossings
create by enacting several statutes for the purpose of avoiding or limiting
crossing accidents.' The interpretation of these laws by the courts, however,
has resulted in much confusion concerning a railroad's duties and the type of
defenses permitted under the statutes.2 As a practicing attorney involved in
personal injury suits initiated as the result of railroad crossing accidents, the
author of this article shares a sense of guilt with other trial attorneys for the
unsettled and confusing legal ruins left by recent efforts to moderate the
statutory interpretations applicable to railroad crossing accidents.
The history of the contradictions in the development of railroad crossing
law and an alternative statutory interpretation to resolve the inconsistencies
evidenced by the courts is the subject of this article.
I. THE HISTORY OF OHIO RAILROAD CROSSING LAW
A. The McCallie Doctrine - Absolute Liability
for Failure to Erect Crossing Signs
A statute may impose an absolute liability with no recognized excuse for
violation. 3 The legislature, within its constitutional powers, may see fit to
place the burden of injuries "upon those who can measurably control their
causes instead of upon those who are in the main helpless in that regard."
4
In the 1969 case of McCallie v. New York Central Railroad,5 the defendant
railroad was held absolutely liable for damages resulting from injuries to
*B.S., College of the Holy Cross; J.D. Cleveland-Marshall Law School. The author is a partner
with the law firm of Spangenberg, Shibley, Traci & Lancione in Cleveland, Ohio. He was counsel
for the plaintiff in the following cases discussed within this article: Glinsey v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
356 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968
(1974); McCallie v. New York Cent. R.R., 23 Ohio App. 2d 152,261 N.E.2d 179 (1969); Weimer v.
Norfolk & Western R.R., No. 34519 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Ohio April 8, 1976), cert. denied, No. 76-
650 (Sun. Ct. Ohio Sept. 24. 1976); and Carhahan v. Akron-Barberton Beltine R.R., No. 28816
(C.P. Summit County Ohio Dec. 10, 1973).
' The safety statutes include OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4955.32, 4955.33, and 4955.34 (Page
1977). The legislative intent to prevent crossing accidents was recognized by the court in Norfolk
& W. Ry. v. Gissuisne, 144 F. 56,59 (6th Cir. 190), which stated that "[s]uch statutes are obviously
for the benefit of those using or about to use the crossing .... This intent to protect travelers is
also indicated in C.C. & I. Ry. v. Reiss, 13 Ohio C.C. 405,407-08,7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 450,451-52 (1st
Cir. 1889) where the court stated that a jury should be instructed that the purpose of requiring a
sign at a railroad crossing is to warn travelers of that crossing.
I Compare McCallie v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 23 Ohio App. 2d 152, 261 N.E.2d 179 (1969) with
Glinsey v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 356 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974).
3 W. PnossER, LAw OF TORTS 197 (4th ed. 1971).
4 St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 296 (1908).
5 23 Ohio App. 2d 152, 261 N.E.2d 179 (1969).
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persons and property for failure to maintain a crossbuck sign at a railroad
crossing. Contributory negligence was precluded as a defense in an action
brought for violation of Ohio Revised Code section 4955.33 which reads as
follows:
§ 4955.33 [Warning signs at highway grade crossings. .. .
At all points where its railroad crosses a public road at a common
grade, each company shall erect a sign . . . to give notice of the
proximity of the railroad and warn persons to be on the lookout for
the locomotive. . . . A company which neglects or refuses to
comply with this section is liable in damages for all injuries which
occur to persons or property from such neglect or refusal.6
The trial tactics employed by the plaintiff in McCallie present an excellent
example of the difference in a verdict which will result from complete as
opposed to partial statutory interpretation. The fact that absolute liability was
imposed was due, at least in part, to the plaintiff's argument that the last
sentence of Ohio Revised Code section 4955.33 added a dimension to the
statute which went beyond the liability for negligence imposed by Ohio
Revised Code section 4955.32 for failure to comply with sound signal
requirements. 7 The plaintiff argued that the last sentence of section 4955.33
made, the company absolutely liable for all injuries caused by its non-
compliance with the statute. The trial court, adopting the plaintiff's argument,
instructed the jury that the words "is liable" contained in the last sentence of
the crossbuck statute enlarged the railroad's duty to construct a crossbuck sign
and imposed a further penalty for breach of this statute so that contributory
negligence could not be a defense. The very real probability was that if
McCallie had been tried simply as a negligence case, the trial judge would
have directed a verdict for the defendant because of the defendant's
compliance with the sound signal requirements and the plaintiff's failure to
listen at a time and place where listening would have revealed the presence of
the train.
The court of appeals affirmed McCallie, holding that section 4955.33
renders a railroad strictly liable for damages proximately caused by the
railroad's failure to maintain a crossbuck sign at a railroad crossing. According
to that court, where a statute directs the performance of a duty coupled with
liability in damages for failure to perform, negligence is not a proper cause of
action. It follows that "without an element of negligence or the opportunity to
be negligent in performance, [the defense of] contributory negligence cannot
exist.""
B. The Glinsey Escape from Absolute Liability
for Failure to Sound Train Signals
Rather than actions for violation of the crossbuck statute, the majority of
personal injury suits brought for railroad crossing accidents are causes of
action for violation of Ohio Revised Code section 4955.32 which requires a
6 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.33 (Page 1977) (emphasis added).
7 Ohio Revised Code section 4955.32 details the railroad's duties in the provision of audible
warnings as its trains approach crossings. See note 9 infra.
8 23 Ohio App. 2d 152, 159, 261 N.E.2d 179, 184 (1969).
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train approaching a crossing to give an audible warning to the traffic in the
area.
9
A warning case in which the plaintiff employed a statutory construction
argument similar to McCallie v. New York Central Railroad' is Glinsey v.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad." Glinsey arose as a consequence of a railroad-
highway crossing accident in which Willie Glinsey was killed and James
Glinsey was injured. The administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Willie
Glinsey, and the party injured, James Glinsey, sued the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad in federal district court for the engineer's failure to blow the train's
whistle and sound its bell in compliance with Ohio Revised Code section
4955.32.12 Before the trial, the plaintiffs filed a motion in limine seeking to
exclude evidence of contributory negligence, namely that Willie Glinsey may
have been intoxicated at the time of the accident and that the Glinseys' car
may have been stolen. The plaintiffs argued that such evidence was not
relevant because Ohio Revised Code section 4955.34 imposed absolute
liability for the violation of section 4955.32 and that therefore the defense of
contributory negligence was unavailable. The statute invoked by the plaintiff
states in part:
4955.34. Failure to erect warning signs; forfeiture.
Every engineer . . . who fails to comply with section
4955.32 . . . is personally liable ....
The company in whose employ such engineer or person in charge
of an engine is [sic] as well as the person himself, is liable in damages
to a person or company injured in person or property by such neglect
or act of such engineer or person.' 3
In its instructions to the jury, the district court interpreted section 4955.32
as a specific safety statute, the violation of which would be negligence per se
but which would not necessarily foreclose the defense of contributory
negligence. The court then gave another instruction similar in its temper to
that given in McCallie v. New York Central Railroad which informed the jury
that section 4955.34 provides strict liability for violation of section 4955.32 and
that section 4955.32 could not be interpreted without making reference to
section 4955.34. The court viewed the language of section 4955.34 as identical
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.32 (Page 1977) reads in part:
Every company shall attach to each locomotive engine passing upon its railroad a bell of
the ordinary size in use on such engine and a steam or compressed air whistle. When an
engine [is] in motion and approaching a turnpike, highway, or street crossing or private
crossing where the view of such crossing is obstructed by embankment, trees, curve, or
other obstruction to view, upon the same line with the crossing, and in like manner
where the railroad crosses any other traveled place, by bridge or otherwise, the engineer
or person in charge of such engine shall sound such whistle at a distance of at least eighty
and not further than one hundred rods from such crossing and ring such bell
continuously until the engine passes the crossing.
10 23 Ohio App. 2d 152, 261 N.E.2d 179 (1969).
" 356 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
968 (1974).
12 See note 9 supra.
'3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.34 (Page 1977). The caption to this statute is obviously
erroneous in its reference to the warning sign requirement. If the statute was truly one for
violation of the warning sign requirement of section 4955.33, the reference within the text of the
statute would be to section 4955.33 rather than section 4955.32.
1978]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1978
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
to other strict liability statutes 4 and thus held that, taken together, the two
statutes impose strict liability to which contributory negligence is not a
defense. 15
By arguing that section 4955.34 imposes strict liability, the plaintiffs in
Glinsey were employing a legal theory that apparently had never been urged
upon an Ohio court.' 6 The district court did not consider itself bound by stare
decisis:
The courts of Ohio have not consistently treated sections 4955.32 and
4955.34. The first case to interpret section 4955.32 was Pennsylvania
Co. v. Rathgeb, 32 Ohio St. 66 (1877). The Supreme Court of Ohio
noted, in analyzing 4955.32, that proof of contributory negligence
could negate the railroad's negligence. However no case has reached
the Ohio Supreme Court since 1926 on this section. Additionally the
argument presented by plaintiff combining as it does 4955.32 and
4955.34 has never been raised in any court of this state. The court is,
therefore, faced with a matter of first impression.1 7
A comparison of section 4955.33,18 held in McCallie to impose strict
liability for failure to erect a sign, and section 4955.34, held by the lower court
in Glinsey to impose strict liability for failure to properly warn, reveals a great
similarity in their wording. Section 4955.33 states that the railroad company
"is liable in damages" if it "neglects or refuses" to comply with the crossing
sign requirement.' 9 Section 4955.34 states that the railroad company "is liable
in damages" to a person injured by the "neglect or act of such engineer" in
failing to give the required whistle and bell signals. 20
Unfortunately for the consistency of interpretation of Ohio railroad
crossing law, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the
trial court in Glinsey v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad2 by rejecting the strict
liability argument of section 4955.34 for violation of section 4955.32. The court
indicated that its decision reflected the application of Ohio law as the court
believed it would be construed by the Ohio Supreme Court:
Appellees' novel argument would have us discard a century of case
law that has weaved contributory negligence into the tapestry of
Ohio railroad accident law. We do not believe that the Ohio
Supreme Court would do this, despite the force of Appellees'
argument, and we may not do that which we believe Ohio's highest
court would refuse to do.22
14 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 955.28 (dog bite statute) and 3743.33 (use of fireworks)
(Page 1977).
15 356 F. Supp. 984, 987 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
16 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974).
17 356 F. Supp. at 987.
18 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
" Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.33 (Page 1977).
20 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.34 (Page 1977).
21 356 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
968 (1974).
22 495 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1974).
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The court relied on Ohio case law which developed as a result of
negligence actions brought as violations of section 4955.32.23 Standing alone,
section 4955.32 is obviously a specific safety statute and failure to comply with
its requirements is negligence per se. 24 Prior to Glinsey, every action brought
under section 4955.32 was a cause of action for negligence and the defendants
were allowed to introduce evidence of contributory negligence. 2 For
example, in Pennsylvania Railroad v. Rusynick, 26 the Ohio Supreme Court
held that it is the duty of a traveler, before going over the railway, to look both
ways and listen for the approaching trains. Imposing the duty to stop, look,
and listen, the courts have found that omission of the duty to act, without a
reasonable cause therefor, will defeat such party's action to which the party's
negligence contributed. 2
7
Although the Sixth Circuit refused to recognize a strict liability cause of
action for railroad crossing injuries, 28 the court did find merit in the plaintiff-
appellee's argument that the legislature, in enacting section 4955.34, intended
to impose liability which extended beyond the negligence standard of section
4955.32:
Were we sitting as a court with authority to interpret Ohio law, we
might find Appellees' arguments persuasive. . . .[I]f contributory
negligence is not precluded by the final sentence in section 4599.34
[sic] then it seems to be surplusage, since under ordinary negligence
law a plaintiff's situation would be identical without the presence of
that sentence. We are, however, limited to a best estimate of what
the Ohio Supreme Court would do if it could consider Appellees'
contentions. Our best estimate is that the Ohio Supreme Court
would reaffirm its prior holdings rather than accept Appellees' point
of view.29
In Weimer v. Norfolk and Western Railroad, 30 a case decided subsequent
to Glinsey, the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals also rejected an
interpretation of sections 4955.32 and 4955.34 which would have resulted in
the imposition of strict liability. Like Glinsey, the court in Weimer stated that
"a long line of cases in the Supreme Court of Ohio have interpreted these
statutes (Ohio Revised Code sections 4955.32 and 4955.34), or comparable
23 Zuments v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 27 Ohio St. 2d 71, 271 N.E.2d 813 (1971); North v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 9 Ohio St. 2d 169, 224 N.E.2d 757 (1967); Bales v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 168
Ohio St. 551, 156 N.E.2d 735 (1959); Cabb v. Bushy, 152 Ohio St. 336, 89 N.E.2d 466 (1949);
Capelle v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 136 Ohio St. 203, 24 N.E.2d 822 (1940); Patton v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N.E.2d 597 (1939); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 530,
159 N.E. 826 (1927); Pennsylvania Co. v. Rathgeb, 32 Ohio St. 66 (1877).
24 See Pennsylvania HR. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 530, 159 N.E. 826 (1927).
25 See, e.g., Bales v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 168 Ohio St. 551, 156 N.E. 2d 735 (1959); Cleveland
C. & C. R.H. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 631 (1874).
26 117 Ohio St. 530, 159 N.E. 826 (1927).
27 See Pennsylvania HR. v. Rathgeb, 32 Ohio St. 66 (1877).
28 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974).
29 Id. at 569-70 n.5.
3' No. 34519 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Ohio April 8, 1976), cert. denied, No. 76-650 (Sup. Ct. Ohio
Sept. 24, 1976).
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predecessors, as per se negligence statutes not precluding the defense of
contributory negligence."3' The Weimer court made the noteworthy
observation that section 4955.34 is not a repetitious reenactment of the section
4955.32 negligence standard:
[I] t is a tenable argument that strict liability is a consequence of
violation and contributory negligence not a defense. If the statute is
deemed nothing more than a negligence per se enactment, then the
last paragraph of Ohio Revised Code §4955.34 is a redundancy. And
one does not assume that the legislature acted to no purpose.
However, we are not approaching the problem afresh without
the gloss of a higher court opinion.32
Weimer did recognize a distinction between causes of action under
sections 4955.32 and 4955.34; however, the court felt constrained by the
decisions of higher courts, notably the Sixth Circuit in Glinsey, and therefore
held that contributory negligence is a defense in a section 4955.34 action.
Thus, the weakness in both the Glinsey and Weimer decisions is that neither
dealt with the statutory interpretation dilemma generated when sections
4955.32 and 4955.34 are considered in the same cause of action. By
recognizing the propriety of the strict liability argument in an action under
section 4955.34 and then dispensing with it on the basis of authority in which
the cause of action was pleaded in negligence under section 4955.32, both
courts bypassed the real issue of the meaning and legislative intent present in
section 4955.34.
The conflict between the extent and manner of statutory interpretation
presented in McCallie v. New York Central Railroad33 and Glinsey v.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad3 4 is typical of the confusion that has permeated
Ohio railroad crossing law for years. Certainly at this time McCallie continues
to be the law and in any case in which there is evidence of violation of section
4955.33, the plaintiff's theory ought to sound in statutory liability and not in
negligence. On the other hand, it seems quite clear that sections 4955.32 and
4955.34 are being interpreted merely as negligence statutes, the violation of
which may be defended on the basis of contributory negligence. It should be
carefully noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Ohio has not yet ruled on
this question. Trial courts, whether federal or state, almost certainly will, in
fact, allow the defense of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of
Ohio should, and undoubtedly will, address directly the question of the scope
of liability intended by section 4955.34.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 4955.34
A. The Ohio Rules of Statutory Construction
A statute has been defined as "the written will of the legislature and as a
rule of action prescribed by the supreme power of a state which all persons
31 Id., slip op. at 6.
32 Id., slip op. at 5-6.
33 23 Ohio App. 2d 152, 261 N.E.2d 179 (1969).
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within the sphere of its operation are compelled to obey."35 It is the duty of the
courts to give effect to the will of the legislature; therefore the process of
statutory construction is undertaken by the courts only to the degree
necessary to ascertain the legislative intent of an enactment.36 As one Ohio
court has stated, the construction of a statute is limited to the written word:
The primary purpose of the judiciary in the interpretation or
construction of statutes is to give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, as gathered from the provisions enacted, by the
application of well settled rules of interpretation. . . . The court
must look to the statute itself to determine legislative intent, and if
such intent is cearly [sic] expressed therein, the statute may not be
restricted, constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged.
3 7
It is the province of the courts to construe and interpret statutes only when
the language employed is ambiguous and the meaning and application
thereof uncertain.38 Where a statute is plain and unequivocal, however, courts
should not attempt to determine what the legislature should have enacted or
even what it may have intended to enact.3 9 The Supreme Court of Ohio has
limited the process of statutory interpretation in the following syllabus:
1., [W]here [a statute's] provisions are ambiguous, and its meaning
doubtful, the history of legislation on the subject, and the
consequences of a literal interpretation of the language may be
considered; punctuation may be changed or disregarded; words
transposed, or those necessary to a clear understanding and, as
shown by the context manifestly intended, inserted.
2. But the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the
language employed .... 40
Judicial construction of statutes is to be used as a last resort after the courts
have failed to discover the legislature's intent from the plain words of the
statute. In addition, courts must give meaning to every word used in the
statute. In Carmean v. Board of Education,41 the Ohio Supreme Court stated
that "[i]t is axiomatic in statutory construction that words are not inserted into
an act without some purpose. '" 42
In order to apply these rules of statutory construction to the second
15 50 OHio JuR, 2D Statutes § 2 (1961).
11 Detzel v. Nieberding, 7 Ohio Misc. 262, 219 N.E.2d 327 (C.P. Hamilton County 1966).
17 Id. at 265, 219 N.E.2d at 330-31 (citations omitted).
,8 Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co. v. Oberlander, 109 Ohio St. 592, 143 N.E. 191 (1924).
39 Id. at 596-97, 143 N.E. at 193.
40 Slingfull v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 621, 64 N.E. 574, 574 (1902), involving a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the statute in question was so clear on its face
that the court should not attempt to construe it and certainly could not alter its wording or
punctuation as requested by the appellants. The court felt that the intent and meaning of the act
would be apparent to every intelligent reader and therefore granted the motion to dismiss.
41 170 Ohio St. 415, 165 N.E.2d 918 (1960).
42 Id. at 422, 165 N.E.2d at 923. See also Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387 (1853) in which
Judge Thurman expressed precisely the same view when he wrote, "[i]t is a general presumption
that every word in a statute was inserted for some purpose. Mere idle and useless repetitions of
meaning are not to be supposed, if it can be fairly avoided." Id. at 402.
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paragraph of Ohio Revised Code section 4955.34,43 analysis must first be
made of Ohio Revised Code section 4955.32. Section 4955.32, requiring a
crossing signal, is a safety statute. 44 Violation of this statute, standing alone,
constitutes negligence per se, exposing the railroad to liability in negligence
for the injury proximately caused by the act, subject, as are all negligence
actions, to the defense of contributory negligence.
Since liability for the injury caused by violation of section 4955.32 is
already imposed by that statute, the liability for injury established by section
4955.34 is either intended to be identical to that created by section 4955.32 or it
is intended to be different from it. To hold that it is identical would violate the
basic principle of statutory construction that requires meaning to be given to
the enactments of the legislature and demands only that the words of the
statute be applied. In order for the second paragraph of section 4955.34 to
have any meaning, it must create some additional penalty for violating the
statute requiring locomotive signals at a crossing. It is only after a
determination that section 4955.34 establishes an additional penalty that the
process of judicial construction can be employed. At that point, the court can
construct and interpret section 4955.34 only to the extent of determining the
type of penalty it imposes. In this process of statutory construction, every
word in the statute must be recognized and compared in terms of its use and
significance in similar statutes.
B. The Specific Interpretation of Section 4955.34
Section 4955.34 must add a dimension of liability different in kind and
effect from that imposed by section 4955.32 in order for section 4955.34 to
have any meaning.
Whether one characterizes section 4955.34 as creating an additional
obligation or imposing an additional penalty, it obviously must be designed to
inure to the benefit of someone - and by its terms the statute establishes the
injured party as the beneficiary. Since the quantum or quality of the damage
award would not be affected by the fact that the award was based on
negligence per se under section 4955.32 or "liability" under section 4955.34,
the benefit is not in the nature of damages. The only benefit proscribed by
reason of the enactment of section 4955.34 to one injured by reason of
violation of section 4955.32 must, therefore, relate to the defenses available.
The benefit inuring from the enactment of section 4955.34 is a liability which
attaches without regard to negligence and to which contributory negligence is
not a defense.
If section 4955.34 is considered to be providing merely a remedy for an
injury directly caused by the failure of the engineer to comply with the statute,
it is a redundant waste and a useless enactment. Only if it is considered to be a
43 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.34 (Page 1977). The scope of this discussion is limited to the
second paragraph of section4955.34 since that is the statutory provision which appears to negate a
contributory negligence defense. The paragraph reads as follows: "The company in whose
employ such engineer or person in charge of an engine is [sic], as well as the person himself, is
liable in damages to a person or company injured in person or property by such neglect or act of
such engineer or person."
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.32 (Page 1977). In addition to creating a cause of action for
negligence, section 4955.32 sets forth the requirements for giving notice of an approaching train.
[Vol. 27:505
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penalty statute for the failure of the engineer to perform the statutory
requirements intended to provide notice of the train's approach does it have
meaning and purpose. In Weimer v. Norfolk and Western Railroad45 the Ohio
court of appeals addressed this argument as follows:
Because Ohio Revised Code §4955.34 posits precisely the same
liability for a railroad when an employee responsible for warning
signals fails to give them, it is a tenable argument that strict liability is
a consequence of violation and contributory negligence not a
defense. If the statute is deemed nothing more than a negligence per
se enactment, then the last paragraph of Ohio Revised Code
§4955.34 is a redundancy. And one does not assume that the
legislature acted to no purpose.4 6
According to McCallie v. New York Central Railroad,47 where a statute
directs the performance of a duty coupled with a liability in damages for
failure to perform, negligence is not a cause of action. It follows that "without
an element of negligence or the opportunity to be negligent in performance,
contributory negligence cannot exist." 48
Prior to McCallie, Ohio courts engaged in a similar process of statutory
interpretation for a case brought under the Ohio dog bite statute.4 9 The Ohio
Supreme Court construed the statute as imposing "an absolute liability on the
owner of the dog, [finding that] the averment and proof of scienter are
unnecessary. . . . Under the statute, the conduct of his property renders him
liable, and his own negligence in the matter is wholly immaterial." 50
In another dog bite case, Bevin v. Griffiths,1 the court held that the im-
position of strict liability for violation of the dog bite statute is based on the
reasoning that: (a) imposing strict liability is a legislative and not a judicial
determination; (b) the language is plain and simple and the intent of the
legislature is first initially discerned from the language employed; (c) the
province of construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of that which the
legislature enacted; (d) the plain and unambiguous language "shall be liable"
imposes strict liability; (e) it is the duty of the courts to enforce a statute which
is plain and unambiguous. 52
Like the language of the crossbuck 53 and the dog bite54 statutes, the
language of section 4955.34 is plain and unambiguous and therefore the same
strict liability interpretation applied to sections 4955.33 and 955.28 should be
45 No. 34519 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Ohio April 8, 1976), cert. denied, No. 76-650 (Sup. Ct. Ohio
Sept. 24, 1976).
46 Id., slip op. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
17 23 Ohio App. 2d 152, 261 N.E.2d 179 (1969).
48 Id. at 159, 261 N.E.2d at 184.
49 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.28 (Page 1977). This statute provides in pertinent part: "The
owner or keeper shall be liable for any damage or injuries caused by a dog . (emphasis
added). The statute was previously codified in OHIO GEN. CODE § 5938.
10 Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 61, 66, 105 N.E. 192, 194 (1913).
," 44 Ohio App. 94, 184 N.E. 401 (1902).
52 Id. at 98-100, 184 N.E. at 403.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.33 (Page 1977).
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 955. 28 (Page 1968).
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applied by the courts when a cause of action is presented under section
4955.34. Where language is plain and unambiguous and contains no
exceptions, the presumption is that the legislature intended that there be no
exceptions and it is not the province of the court to create an exception by
construction through the allowance of the defense of contributory
negligence. 55 The imposition of strict liability in cases involving the violation
of statutes with wording identical to the liability imposed by section 4955.34
proves that in Ohio, where a statute imposes a duty and liability in damages
for failure to comply with the imposed duty, the legislative intent is to impose
strict liability.5 6 Other statutes using the language "is liable" or "shall be liable"
have been held to impose strict liability.57 Thus, based on the interpretation of
similar statutes, the statutorily-imposed duty of section 4955.32 together with
the "is liable" language of section 4955.34 requires the application of strict
liability. Any other interpretation, including that of Glinsey v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad,58 and Weimer v. Norfolk and Western Railroad,9 would be
inconsistent with the meaning of the statute under Ohio's clearly defined limits
of statutory interpretation.
III. ADDING TO THE CONFUSION: OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 4999.04
A. The Duty of Adequate Warning
The incongruity between statutory and judicial interpretations of Ohio
railroad crossing laws does not end with a determination of the scope of
liability imposed upon the railroad. Inconsistency extends into the limits of
the duty that the engineer of a train has in terms of warning traffic at an
approaching crossing.
In Glinsey v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,60 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals commented on the "patent erroneousness [of an interpretation of
Ohio law which] required that the train's whistle (or horn) be sounded
continously for the entire distance of 1320 [feet] to the crossing." 61 Weimer v.
Norfolk and Western Railroad,62 in following Glinsey, articulated the warning
requirement under Ohio Revised Code section 4955.326 as one which
5 Siegfred v. Everhart, 55 Ohio App. 351, 353, 9 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1936).
56 McCallie. v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 23 Ohio App. 2d 152, 261 N.E.2d 179 (1969).
-7 In Davis v. Atlas Ins. Co., 112 Ohio St. 543, 147 N.E. 913 (1925), the court held that section
8970 of the General Code, which provided that "[e]very company ... operating a
railroad . . . shall be liable for all loss or damage by fires originating upon land belonging to it
caused by operating such road," imposed absolute liability on railroad companies that breached
the statute. Also, in Bolton v. Barkhurst, 27 Ohio Misc. 105 (C.P. Wood County 1971), the court
stated that Ohio Revised Code section 951.10 was a trespass statute imposing strict liability for
damages to the premises of another. That statute reads in pertinent part: "The owner or keeper of
an animal described in section 951.02 of the Revised Code, who permits it to run at large in
violation of such section is liable for all damages caused by such animal .... "
58 356 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir., cert. denied, 419 U.S.
968 (1974).
59 No. 34519 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Ohio April 8, 1976), cert. denied, No. 76-650 (Sup. Ct. Ohio.
Sept. 24, 1976).
"0 356 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 565 (6th Cir., cert. denied, 419 U.S.
968 (1974).
61 495 F.2d at 570.
62 No. 34519 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Ohio April 8, 1976), cert. denied, No. 76-650 (Sup. Ct. Ohio
Sept. 24, 1976).
6 Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 4955.32 (Page 1977).
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required that the whistle be sounded once when the engine is between 1320
and 1650 feet from the crossing.
64
If the Weimer and Glinsey interpretations are correct, they are in direct
conflict with Ohio Revised Code section 4999.0465 which reads in part:
(A) No person in charge of a locomotive shall do the following:
(2) When approaching a grade crossing, fail to sound the locomotive
whistle at frequent intervals, beginning not less than fifteen hundred
feet from such crossing and continuing until the locomotive has
passed the crossing. 66
The inconsistency in the warning requirement evidenced by sections
4955.32 and 4999.04 gives a trial judge an option in his jury instructions. He
could either read section 4955.32 and tell the jury the law requires a single
whistle warning or read section 4999.04 and tell the jury that the law requires a
continuous whistle. Any legislative intent to have one of the two statutes
control is, therefore, defeated by their contradiction.
B. Evidence of the Legislative Intent of Section 4999.04
In determining the type of warning signal the legislature intended a
railroad engineer to use when approaching a crossing, a court should consider
the purpose of such warnings and the history of conduct of the party the
statute is intended to benefit. This, along with other statutes used to discern
legislative intent, should provide the court with an adequate basis for
statutory interpretation.
Ohio courts have determined the public to be the benefactor of railroad
crossing law and have recognized the "substantial risk of danger" existing at
all railroad crossings.6 7 Prior to the appellate decision in Glinsey, Carnahan v.
Akron-Barberton Beltline Railroad6 indicated that it would not seem to be an
unduly harsh policy to strictly require the continuous soundings of warnings
by railroad companies because of the number of accidents occurring at
railroad crossings.
It is, therefore, a reasonable argument based on public policy that Ohio
Revised Code section 4999.04 defines the railroad's duty to blow its whistle
upon approaching a crossing. Even without the public policy argument, the
duty imposed by section 4999.04 can be the basis of conduct relied on in a
negligence action. If section 4999.04 is not introduced in the action as the
standard of conduct, the standard imposed by the court will be section
4955.32. The difference is drastic - when an engine whistle is sounded 1500
feet from the crossing there would be no civil liability under section 4955.32
but there would be a continuing civil and criminal liability under section
4999.04. Unless and until the Ohio Supreme Court reviews the Weimer
interpretation of section 4955.32 as to the character of the whistle signal, a
64 No. 34519, slip op. at 4 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Ohio April 8, 1976), cert. denied, No. 76-650
(Sup. Ct. Ohio Sept. 24, 1976).
65 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4999.04 (Page 1977).
66 Id.
67 Hood v. New York, Chicago& St. L. R.R., 166 Ohio St. 529,536,144 N.E.2d 104,109 (1957).
68 No. 288126 (C.P. Summit County, Ohio Dec. 10, 1973).
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plaintiff would be ill advised to utilize violation of that statute as a basis of a
motorist action. Reliance should rather be placed on section 4999.04, which
imposes a more stringent warning requirement for the same action.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ambiguities expressed within Ohio Revised Code section 4955.32 are
the sparks igniting the confusion in Ohio railroad crossing law. The engi-
neer's duty can easily be established in a negligence action by ignoring the
contradictory section 4955.32 and instead bringing the negligence action
under section 4999.04. The contradiction in the scope of the railroad's liability
evidenced in sections 4955.32 and 4955.34 is not reconcilable. Unless the
Supreme Court of Ohio modifies the interpretation given to Ohio Revised
Code sections 4955.32 and 4955.34 by the Sixth Circuit in Glinsey v. Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad, contributory negligence will continue to be a valid
defense when an action is brought against a railroad for breach of its statutory
duty. This defense destroys the protection the Ohio legislature intended to
give motorists against the hazard that a railroad crossing presents, in addition
to making section 4955.34 unenforceable as to the imposition of liability upon
railroad companies. Either section 4955.34 should be repealed or the courts
should begin to follow the firmly established rules of statutory interpreta-
tion already utilized for crossbuck sign violations rather than slipping into the
familiarity of a stare decisis doctrine which fails to consider the implication
of section 4955.34.
[Vol. 27:505
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss4/14
